

July 24, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

418. Moustaklis, S., —, Inf., 4.11.67.
 419. Scouros, K., —, Signal, 29.12.67.
 420. Zervakis, G., 1913, Inf., 11.1.68.
 421. Chatzistyllanos, N., 1913, Inf., 11.1.68.
 422. Tzanes, P., 1913, Inf., 11.1.68.
 423. Kontopoulos, N., 1913, Inf., 11.1.68.
 424. Papaikononou, J., 1913, Inf., 11.1.68.
 425. Pardos, K., 1913, Artill., 11.1.68.
 426. Andreadis, A., 1913, Artill., 11.1.68.
 428. Vougiouklakis, G., 1913, O.B., 11.1.68.
 429. Lemonakis, N., 1913, O.B., 11.1.68.
 430. Boukalis, A., 1913, O.B., 11.1.68.
 431. Cheizanoglou, E., 1913, Signal, 11.1.68.
 432. Delopoulos, E., 1913, Signal, 11.1.68.
 433. Irinidis, K., 1913, Signal, 11.1.68.
 434. Gravanis, D., 1913, T.B., 11.1.68.
 435. Frangiadakis, G., 1913, T.B., 11.1.68.
 436. Dolkas, K., 1913, T.B., 11.1.68.
 437. Gekas, E., 1913, O.B., 11.1.68.
 438. Bolossis, P., 1913, O.B., 11.1.68.
 439. Paparas, G., 1913, T.C., 11.1.68.
 440. Chaliasos, A., 1913, O.B., 11.1.68.
 441. Markoulidis, D., 1913, M.C., 11.1.68.
 442. Pispas, P., 1913, M.C., 11.1.68.
 443. Mozeras, A., 1913, —, 11.1.68.
 444. Papandreou, G., 1925, Inf., 31.1.68.
 445. Avrameas, M., 1927, Signal, 31.1.68.
 446. Demestichas, D., 1927, Inf., 31.1.68.
 447. Fountoulakis, G., 1917, Inf., 31.1.68.
 448. Karoussos, G., 1925, Inf., 31.1.68.
 449. Pnevmatikos, A., 1928, Inf., 31.1.68.
 450. Vamvakas, Ch., 1930, Artill., 31.1.68.
 451. Kourkafas, B., 1925, Inf., 31.1.68.
 452. Papanikolaou, K., 1926, Inf., 31.1.68.
 453. Polichroniou, D., 1922, Signal, 31.1.68.
 454. Kapelaris, D., 1926, Inf., 31.1.68.
 455. Zissis, D., 1928, Inf., 31.1.68.
 456. Lelos, G., 1924, Inf., 31.1.68.
 457. Mantakos, P., 1926, Inf., 31.1.68.
 458. Bouras, D., 1928, Eng., 31.1.68.
 459. Chamartos, J., 1928, Signal, 31.1.68.
 460. Kotsakis, N., 1911, Inf., 31.1.68.
 461. Kastrinakis, S., 1918, Inf., 1.2.68.
- CAPTAIN
462. Triantafyllou, P., 1928, Signal, 19.5.67.
 463. Katsaris, Th., 1917, Signal, 19.5.67.
 464. Theodorou, Ch., 1918, Signal, 19.5.67.
 465. Mathioudakis, A., 1935, Inf., 19.5.67.
 466. Chatzianastassiou, D., 1917, T.C., 19.5.67.
- 5.67.
467. Spanos, K., 1925, Artill., 4.10.67.
 468. Mathioudakis, B., 1927, Artill., 4.10.67.
 469. Tsagris, B., 1931, Artill., 4.10.67.
 470. Petropoulakis, B., 1930, Artill., 4.10.67.
 471. Zarkadas, A., 1931, Artill., 4.10.67.
 472. Yannopoulos, J., 1930, Artill., 4.10.67.
 473. Chalofitis, J., 1933, Artill., 4.10.67.
 474. Chondroyannis, K., 1922, Inf., 4.10.67.
 475. Korkalis, S., 1926, Inf., 4.10.67.
 476. Kalaitzakis, E., 1928, Inf., 4.10.67.
 477. Violakis, E., 1930, Inf., 4.10.67.
 478. Korkoliakos, D., 1928, Inf., 4.10.67.
 479. Leounakis, J., 1928, Inf., 4.10.67.
 480. Matzos, A., 1926, Inf., 4.10.67.
 481. Stergiopoulos, E., 1928, Inf., 4.10.67.
 482. Xiftilis, E., 1932, Inf., 4.10.67.
 483. Karabaris, G., 1931, Inf., 4.10.67.
 484. Archakis, A., 1930, Inf., 4.10.67.
 485. Papadongonas, D., 1924, Inf., 4.10.67.
 486. Kanterakis, S., 1919, Inf., 4.10.67.
 487. Kostopoulos, M., 1926, Inf., 4.10.67.
 488. Katsiyannis, D., 1931, Inf., 4.10.67.
 489. Zervas, Ch., 1933, Inf., 4.10.67.
 490. Palatzas, D., 1928, Eng., 4.10.67.
 491. Michalaklis, G., 1928, Signal, 4.10.67.
 492. Angelakis, J., 1925, Signal, 4.10.67.
 493. Chatzidakis, E., 1926, Signal, 4.10.67.
 494. Spanoudakis, Th., 1929, Armour, 4.10.67.
- 67.
495. Yannissis, N., 1930, Armour, 4.10.67.
 496. Melistas, G., 1932, Armour, 4.10.67.
 497. Kyvelos, E., 1931, Armour, 4.10.67.
 498. Minakidis, G., 1933, Armour, 4.10.67.
 499. Katerinis, A., 1927, T.B., 4.10.67.
 500. Androulidakis, B., 1931, T.B., 4.10.67.
 501. Armonis, G., 1927, T.B., 4.10.67.
 502. Skrivanos, S., 1928, T.C., 4.10.67.
 503. Voryolakos, N., 1931, Armour, 17.10.67.
 504. Gerakitis, J., 1931 Inf., 17.10.67.
 505. Karoyannis, A., 1934 Armour, 17.10.67.
506. Koroneos, G., 1934, Armour, 17.10.67.
 507. Koutsoyannakis, J., 1933, Artill., 17.10.67.
 508. Machas, P., 1933, Inf., 17.10.67.
 509. Paradissianos, S., 1933, Inf., 17.10.67.
 510. Polyzos, N., 1932, Inf., 17.10.67.
 511. Sermakezis, S., 1930, Inf., 17.10.67.
 512. Terzakis, Ch., 1930, Inf., 17.10.67.
 513. Trambakoulou, N., 1931, Inf., 17.10.67.
 514. Tsiroidis, A., 1930, Inf., 17.10.67.
 515. Grivis, K., 1924, Inf., 17.10.67.
 516. Koutsodimitropoulos, 1930, Inf., 17.10.67.
 517. Prassas, E., 1931, Inf., 17.10.67.
 518. Papassimakopoulos, N., 1930, Signal, 17.10.67.
 519. Papaspirou, E., 1932, Signal, 17.10.67.
 520. Patsladi, P., 1926, F.B., 17.10.67.
 521. Rangakos, E., 1933, Armour, 17.10.67.
 522. Charissis, X., 1932, Armour, 17.10.67.
 523. Aletras, G., 1934, Armour, 17.10.67.
 524. Bardanis, M., 1936, Armour, 17.10.67.
 525. Chronis, J., 1936, M.C., 17.10.67.
 526. Ziras, K., —, Inf., 4.11.67.
 527. Psaros, S., 1933, Artill., 9.11.67.
 528. Papaefthimiou, J., — O.B., 29.12.67.
 529. Kallitsounakis, E., 1915, Inf., 11.1.68.
 530. Laskos, Ch., 1915, Inf., 11.1.68.
 531. Petrakis, A., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 532. Romanos, N., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 533. Krystalis, N., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 534. Boretis, N., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 535. Katsiyannis, E., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 536. Drakopoulos, N., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 537. Antonakos, L., 1913, Adm., 11.1.68.
 538. Nissiotis, A., 1915, Artill., 11.1.68.
 539. Millionis, Th., 1915, T.C., 11.1.68.
 540. Agorastos, A., 1915, M.C., 11.1.68.
 541. Ioannou, A., 1915, V.C., 11.1.68.
 542. Grinitzaklis, J., 1915 V.C., 11.1.68.
 543. Partheniou, N., 1915 V.C., 11.1.68.
 544. Nikoloudakis, J., 1913, V.C., 11.1.68.
 545. Koukouvlos, D., 1928, Inf., 31.1.68.
 546. Skourkeas, S., 1932, Inf., 31.1.68.
 547. Papageorgopoulos, G., 1933, Inf., 31.1.68.
 548. Koufallakis, E., 1927, Armour, 1.2.68.
 549. Kanellos, A., 1919, T.B., 1.2.68.

FIRST LIEUTENANT

550. Rimikis, N., 1925, Inf., 19.5.67.
 551. Kazalakis, G., 1920, Inf., 19.5.67.
 552. Loukianos, J., 1925, Inf., 19.5.67.
 553. Karlis, G., 1934, Inf., 19.5.67.
 554. Tsoumbas, A., 1942, Eng., 9.11.67.
 555. Mastoras, Ch., 1917, Mus., 9.11.67.
 556. Sideris, A., 1940, Signal, 31.1.68.
- COLONEL
557. Neroutsos, A., 1911, Inf., 19.5.67.
 558. Vassiliadis, G., 1911, Artill., 19.5.67.

(At this point, Mr. CLARK took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMENDATION OF SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to congratulate our Secretary of State, and for the way in which our policy has been conducted in connection with the current crisis in Czechoslovakia. I believe that Secretary Rusk is absolutely right in emphasizing to the Soviet Government that any alleged "imperialist" activity in Czechoslovakia has nothing whatsoever to do with the United States

and in emphasizing, too, that the United States intends to stay on the sidelines.

We should not provide the Soviets with even the shadow of an excuse for intervening forcefully in Czechoslovakia. They—and they alone—must bear the responsibility for their own actions. Our greatest contribution can be forbearance, although at the same time I think it worth noting that any use of force by the Soviets in Czechoslovakia would have very great repercussions in this country, as I am sure the Soviet Government realizes.

I have recently returned from a week's visit to Czechoslovakia, a country with which I have had strong personal ties all of my adult life. I have traveled there since before the Second World War. My first assignment in the Foreign Service took me 22 years ago to Prague and then to Bratislava where I established the American consulate general and where I served before and after the Communist putsch in 1948. Since then I have returned to Czechoslovakia several times.

My observations as a result of my most recent visit to Czechoslovakia are contained in a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations which was issued this morning. I would like to recapitulate these observations because I believe that they are particularly timely today.

When I arrived in Prague to begin my first assignment as a Foreign Service officer, I did not, of course, know at the time that Czechoslovakia was soon to become a Communist country solidly entrenched within what was then known as the Soviet bloc. Now, more than 20 years later, Czechoslovakia is still a Communist country and still closely allied to the Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact. But its leaders are attempting to reform Czechoslovakia's Communist society to make it more democratic and more humanistic—more responsive to the will of the Czech and Slovak peoples, more tolerant of dissent, and more progressive socially, economically, and culturally—than it has been at any time during the 20 years of Communist rule.

They have, however, obviously no intention of replacing the present Communist regime with a non-Communist regime of any sort. For there is a central political fact of life governing Czechoslovakia's fate that is as permanent as the baroque architecture of Czechoslovakia's capital city. It is that Czechoslovakia is a small, Central European state and that its fortunes—for better or for worse—must thus lie with the dominant force in Central Europe. From 1938 until 1944 that dominant force was Nazi Germany. Since 1945, that dominant force has been the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovakia's new leaders obviously understand this fact of life. Nevertheless, the country's new liberal and reform-minded leadership, which assumed power in January by obtaining the support of a majority of the Communist Party's central committee, has succeeded in bringing about a greater degree of personal freedom in the country than at any time since 1948. Thus, I found on my recent visit that people would see me who had not been willing

to see me for 20 years, that people would say things to me that they have not been willing to say for 20 years and that people now dare to hope for a future for which they have not dared to hope for 20 years.

But the new personal freedom in Czechoslovakia confronts the Government with a problem of potential internal political pressure. The new government must keep the most active and aggressive reformers—notably the students and intellectuals—under control and make sure that they do not exceed the bounds which would threaten internal stability or jeopardize the basis of Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union.

The new Government must thus face the difficult task of satisfying the desire for political expression while keeping the Communist Party firmly in control. It has often been argued that a nation cannot be partially free—that the desire for freedom is so contagious that once it is allowed to be expressed it cannot be limited or controlled. The people of Czechoslovakia presently seem to be aware of the fact that, for them, history has dictated that whatever freedom they enjoy must be somewhat circumscribed. The greater question is whether the forces of freedom can be kept on the present tight leash or whether they will become unleashed and provoke a Soviet response. Can the genie of freedom be let go?

This, then, is the overriding question for Czechoslovakia today—How far will the Soviets permit the new Government to go in remaking a socialist society? What reforms do the Soviets believe that they can tolerate in a Communist country which would not endanger their security either directly or—and far more importantly—indirectly, through example; an example they do not yet want to see followed in other countries or indeed in their own country? The Kremlin's conservatives are worried by the domino effect following in other Eastern European countries because of the events in Czechoslovakia.

It seems generally recognized in Czechoslovakia that this concern of the Soviet regime—shared by the Polish, East German, and Bulgarian regimes and, to a somewhat lesser degree, by the Hungarians—means that there are very definite limits to the reform movements which must be observed. These limits are that first, Czechoslovakia cannot withdraw from, or show infidelity, to the Warsaw pact; second, the Communist Party must maintain its "leading role" which means that there can be no real opposition political parties or true multi-party system; and, third, there can be no return to private ownership of the means of production and, thus, to a non-Communist society.

The Czechoslovaks believe that they are free to operate within these three limits. But it seems to me that whether the Soviets are willing to settle even for these conditions remains very much an open question. In this connection, there have been, and continue to be, ominous signs in Czechoslovakia, in the Soviet

Union, and in other Warsaw pact countries which have been reported in the American press and thus do not need to be cataloged at this time.

In this morning's press, for example, there are reports of an impending confrontation between the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and reports of large-scale maneuvers of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Czechoslovak frontier. And meanwhile thousands of Soviet troops remain in Czechoslovakia, even though the Warsaw pact maneuvers for which purpose they originally entered Czechoslovakia ended almost 1 month ago.

In the past few weeks, there has been a sudden improvement in the atmosphere as far as our relations with the Soviet Union are concerned. Instruments of ratification of the Consular Convention have been exchanged. The Nonproliferation Treaty has been signed. The Soviets have agreed to begin discussions on offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Air service between Moscow and New York has finally begun. And a new Soviet-American cultural agreement has been concluded.

These developments are most welcome indeed, but they should not distract our attention from the march of events in Czechoslovakia and should in no way allow the Soviets to conclude that, having strengthened their relations with us, they are thus free to intervene in Czechoslovakia with impunity and without serious consequences. It should be obvious to Soviet leaders that an intervention involving naked armed force would be a most damaging blow to their relations with the United States, as well as to East-West detente in Europe. West German refusal to accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty might well be one specific result. Second thoughts in the United States about participating in strategic weapons talks with the Soviet Union might be another.

Certainly I would find it difficult to support efforts to reach agreements with the Soviet Union on matters involving forbearance in the use of force if, at the same time, force was being used in central Europe. I have no doubt that many of my colleagues would share my feelings.

The Munich agreement of 1938 sold out Czechoslovakia for the illusory price of continued peace with Nazi Germany. There is now the danger of a second Munich in Europe—that is, even a tacit agreement with the Soviet Union which would sell Czechoslovakia down the river for the price, again the illusory price, of continued detente.

And there is another historical parallel to bear in mind. The surrender of Czechoslovakia into Hitler's hands through the Munich agreement was the precursor to the Second World War. Czechoslovakia's conversion to communism in 1948 signaled the real beginning of the cold war. Now 20 years later, any attempt by the Soviet Union to use force to repress the efforts of Czechoslovakia's new leaders to reform the Communist system—to reform it, but not replace it—

could revive the cold war and bring on a new ice age in Europe.

MARITIME AUTHORIZATION— CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15189) to authorize appropriations for certain maritime programs of the Department of Commerce. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The assistant legislative clerk read the report.

(For conference report, see House proceedings of July 10, 1968, p. H6302, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on tomorrow, following the prayer and the disposition of the Journal, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to exceed 30 minutes; that immediately following the period set aside for the transaction of routine morning business, there be 30 minutes on the pending conference report, with the time to be controlled by the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS]—15 minutes to a side; and, further, that the vote on the conference report occur not later than 1 p.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I want the RECORD to show that the reason we are doing this is that we need some expeditious action on the conference report because the committee is ready to mark up the appropriation bill for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce and, it cannot do so until we act upon the maritime appropriations which are now involved in the Commerce Department.

The committee is ready to do this, but action has been postponed, not once but twice. I therefore appreciate the cooperation of the Senator from Delaware in this matter to get this done early.

The unanimous-consent agreement reduced to writing is as follows:

Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote on the conference report on H.R. 15189, a bill to authorize appropriations for certain maritime programs of the Department of Commerce, not later than 1 p.m., Thursday, July 25, 1968, and that the 30 minutes following the routine morning business (which period shall not exceed 30 minutes) shall be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS].